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TRAVEL BAN

Travel Ban Update: Ninth Circuit Holds EO-3 Exceeds President’s Power
By Peter Margulies

Tuesday, December 26, 2017, 12:30 PM

On Dec. 22, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Hawaii v. Trump that the September Proclamation (EO-3), inde nitely limiting
immigration from certain listed countries, exceeded the President’s power under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). (For more
context, read my earlier post on the Ninth Circuit oral argument here.) The per curiam decision modeled the thoughtful “common sense”
approach to statutory interpretation that the Supreme Court urged in FDA v. Brown & Williamson. Adopting that common sense reading, the
Ninth Circuit panel, comprised of Judges Ronald M. Gould, Michael D. Hawkins and Richard A. Paez, rejected the government’s uncabined
construction of one INA provision, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), which gives the President power to bar the entry of foreign nationals “detrimental to the
interests of the United States.” The Ninth Circuit stayed its own decision, thus teeing up review by the Supreme Court in 2018.
As the Ninth Circuit noted, Brown & Williamson’s common sense standard rejects reading a statutory provision such as 1182(f) in isolation.
Instead, a court should construe that provision in light of the INA’s language, legislative history and overall scheme. Other key elements of
the INA include reliance on consular of cers’ knowledge of country conditions, the abolition of national origin quotas in 1965, and
Congress’s enactment in that year of a provision—8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(A)—barring national origin discrimination in the issuance of
immigrant visas.
In its strongest criticism of the government, the court rejected the government’s argument that EO-3 was not reviewable at all. Rejecting
this assertion of nonreviewability, the panel cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in the 1993 case Haitian Centers Council v. Sale, in which
the court found that the president had authority to interdict inadmissible foreign nationals navigating the high seas in unsafe vessels.
Despite the government’s assertion that it lacked jurisdiction, the court reached the merits in Sale. Finding that EO-3 was reviewable, the
Ninth Circuit warned that accepting the government’s assertion in this case would mean that the executive branch, “at any time and under
any circumstances, could bar entry of all aliens from any country” without judicial review. That position, the Ninth Circuit warned, would
leave governance gravely out of kilter, allowing the executive branch to “run[] roughshod over the principle of separation of powers.”
Pushing back on the merits against this claim of “unbounded authority,” the Ninth Circuit stressed that common sense counseled against
reading the INA as delegating to the President a power of such “political magnitude.” According to the Ninth Circuit, the government’s
reading of 1182(f) did not t the INA’s “ nely reticulated” statutory scheme. The court noted that the government’s concerns about “identity
management” and counterterrorism cooperation among some of the listed countries (but not all, as David Bier of the Cato Institute has
reported) are already baked in to the INA’s provisions for consular processing. Congress knew that coping with disparate information ows is
part and parcel of what the State Department’s consular of cials do daily. The challenges of obtaining reliable information overseas do not
warrant a presumption that consular discretion is somehow inadequate. Instead, Congress believed that those challenges counseled greater
reliance on consular discretion.
As an illustration, the Ninth Circuit cited recent legislation, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), that limited use of the visa waiver program when foreign
nationals otherwise eligible to enter the U.S. without a visa had traveled to certain unstable areas, including several of the areas cited in EO3. As the Ninth Circuit noted, Congress’s remedy for this possible gap in information was not to empower the executive branch to
categorically ban such individuals. Instead, Congress barred visa waivers for these persons and subjected them to the rigors of visa
processing. That telling legislative choice reveals Congress’s faith that visa processing itself is the best way to address the informational
concerns recounted in EO-3.
In appropriate cases, the government may enhance “procedures” for visa processing in particular countries, under another provision of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(B). For example, the government might direct consular of cers to consider the social media postings of applicants,
including posts supporting terrorist groups. Other country-speci c guidance would might also appropriate. However, an inde nite ban on
issuance of immigrant visas from particular countries con icts with Congress’s overall scheme.
To contain the government’s unbounded reading of 1182(f), the Ninth Circuit also looked to the origins of that provision in 1941 legislation.
As explained in the immigration scholars’ amicus brief that WilmerHale’s Alan Schoenfeld and I led in the Ninth Circuit, Congress
understood that the 1941 law authorizing then President Franklin D. Roosevelt to bar entry of persons “prejudicial to the interests of the
United States” delegated only narrow power to exclude saboteurs and hostile foreign agents. The Ninth Circuit cited legislators’ comments
on the 1941 legislation that clari ed the narrow purposes for which Roosevelt sought the legislation—purposes that we noted in our amicus
brief were borne out in subsequently promulgated regulations.

One aspect of 1182(f) on which the Ninth Circuit could have been more de nitive was past executive practice. On the one hand, the court
accurately assessed President Reagan’s High Seas Interdiction Proclamation (also enforced by later presidents and upheld by the Supreme
Court in Sale) as an effort to stop immigration by foreign nationals who lacked visas and were therefore inadmissible. Unlike EO-3, the
interdiction policy never limited immigration by individuals who had quali ed for visas because of family relationships with U.S. citizens or
lawful permanent residents.
The court was more reticent when addressing two other presidential actions relied on by the government: President Carter’s suspension of
visas for Iranian nationals during the hostage crisis, and Reagan’s suspension of Cuban visas after Cuba reneged on an agreement to
repatriate inadmissible individuals with criminal or psychiatric histories that it had encouraged to migrate to the U.S. as part of the Mariel
Boatlift. The Ninth Circuit said only that no court had reviewed these actions, thereby limiting their utility as precedent.
Despite the court’s reticence, the Iranian and Cuban examples map very well onto the common sense reading of congressional delegation
that the Ninth Circuit advanced. President Carter used a suite of tools to effect the return of U.S. diplomatic personnel that Iran had held
hostage in agrant violation of international law. Those actions included requiring reporting by Iranian students in the U.S. (upheld by the
D.C. Circuit in Narenji v. Civiletti) and settling claims against Iran (upheld by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan). Given the
judicial deference shown toward these other moves, common sense would suggest that barring visas to Iranian nationals was well within the
scope of Congress’s delegation to the president under the INA.
President Reagan’s blocking of Cuban visas ts just as snugly under the delegation rubric. As noted above, Reagan blocked visas to press
Cuba to pivot away from encouraging migration to the U.S. by its inadmissible nationals, including those with criminal histories. In contrast,
EO-3 does not assert that any country subject to its restrictions af rmatively encouraged inadmissible foreign nationals to enter the United
States. Reagan’s response to this bilateral dispute harmonized with extensive travel and trade restrictions that past presidents had imposed
(and the Supreme Court had upheld) on the Castro regime. Against this bilateral backdrop, Reagan’s tailored response to Cuba’s agrant
action ts neatly within Congress’s delegation. In contrast, EO-3’s inde nite multi-country ban strains delegation to the breaking point.
The Ninth Circuit also noted that EO-3 clashes with the anti-discrimination provision that Congress enacted when it abolished national
origin quotas on visas in 1965. As the court explained, Democratic Majority Leader Sen. Mike Mans eld hailed the 1965 legislation as a
“restatement [of] this country’s devotion to equality and freedom.” In his signing statement, President Lyndon Johnson declared that
discrimination “will never again shadow the gate to the American Nation.” Those sentiments would have been mere window dressing if
Congress had intended to delegate to the President authority to unilaterally reimpose national origin quotas through the back door of
1182(f).
To fully address all possible claims of executive power, the Ninth Circuit also held that the president lacked authority under Article II to
implement EO-3. Here, the court cited the Supreme Court’s view in INS v. Chadha that Congress—not the President—has “plenary power”
over immigration. Granting the executive branch uncabined power to rewrite the INA would endanger that core constitutional premise.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit developed a cogent statutory argument against EO-3 based on the touchstone of common sense. Because the court
relied on statutory grounds to invalidate EO-3, it did not have to reach the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge to the
Proclamation. The en banc Fourth Circuit would do well to emulate this approach in its pending decision in IRAP v. Trump (my recent post
on this topic provides more context). The statutory argument will be front and center when, as now seems likely, the Supreme Court
considers the legality of EO-3 in 2018.
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